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ABSTRACT:  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the volatility impacts of the 
suspension of a call auction system by the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) 
in June 1999, thus extending prior empirical work relating to this area.  The realised 
volatility on NSE is compared with that of the Bombay Stock Exchange using two 
volatility proxies: modulus of log returns and scaled intra-day price difference.  We 
also focus on conditional volatility by estimating an AGARCH model on seasonally-
adjusted NSE Nifty Index data.  Whilst some results yield contrasting inferences, the 
overall outcomes indicate that volatility was higher during the auction period, and we 
do not find any evidence that supports the foreseen benefits of auction frameworks.  
Results reinforce the idea that market designers should think about the possible 
interactions with subsidiary market microstructure features when formulating auction 
protocols, since the latter may compromise auction efficacy.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The evaluation of different trading protocols is one of the salient branches of market 
microstructure studies, given its relevance to traders and market designers.  The 
way in which securities markets’ structure can affect the pricing process, volatility, 
liquidity and trading costs, took a prominent role on the research agenda since the 
study of Demsetz (1968), which suggested that factors such as the number of 
traders can affect the spread.  The efficacy of call auctions, as compared to other 
market frameworks such as continuous trading takes a prominent role in this strand 
of literature.  Major trading venues such as the New York Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, the London Stock Exchange, and Xetra use call auctions to open or close 
their trading sessions.    
 
In a call auction framework, incoming orders are batched together and executed 
simultaneously at a common price.  Therefore call auctions are expected to 
aggregate information more efficiently, since a wider cross-section of orders are 
taken into consideration when determining prices (Economides and Schwartz, 1995).  
This contrasts with continuous trading, where transactions take place at any instant 
when two orders on the opposite side of the market may be matched.  In such 
frameworks prices are established during the course of trading, implying that 
transactions may occur at ‘false’ prices until the fundamental value of the security is 
discovered (Schwartz, 2000).  If auctions accelerate price discovery, one may expect 
a lower degree of price dispersion around fundamental values.  Despite this, such 
assertion is not fully supported by empirical literature which offers contradictory 
overall evidence.   
 
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of call auctions in restraining volatility, by 
focusing on the impact of the suspension of opening and closing auctions by the 
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) on 9th June 1999.  This occurrence was 
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considered in prior studies by Camilleri and Green (2009) and Camilleri (2015), 
which offer mixed evidence as to the overall efficacy of these auctions.  In the former 
investigation it was found that intra-day volatility decreased significantly following the 
suspension, yet overnight return reversals became significantly higher.  Camilleri 
(2015) reported that the auction suspension was followed by lower return volatility 
during the middle and the closing parts of the trading day, and higher volatility in the 
opening returns.   
 
We believe that there is still further potential for analysing the volatility changes 
around this auction suspension.  In particular we compare the realised volatility on 
NSE with the volatility on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to inquire whether the 
auction resulted in lower volatility on NSE in relative terms.  In addition, we consider 
changes in longer term conditional volatility on NSE through the estimation of an 
Absolute Value GARCH (AGARCH) model (Heutschel, 1991).  Longer term volatility 
was sidelined in the former papers on the grounds that market microstructure 
changes mainly affect stock prices in the short term.  Yet, one may deduce that 
reductions in short term intra-day volatility may also result in lower longer term 
volatility.  In particular, if closing auctions were contributing to a more efficient market 
price, this should be reflected through lower dispersion in the time series of closing 
prices around the fundamental value of the index portfolio.     
 
The contributions of this paper are twofold.  Firstly, the auction suspension we are 
analysing occurred in the context of a system which involved no other significant 
market microstructure changes during the particular period.  This is a noteworthy 
aspect since modifications in trading protocols typically involve several simultaneous 
reforms which make it unclear whether any impacts are due to a given particular 
factor (Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997).  Secondly we focus on both 
realised and modelled volatility, and one may expect to capture a more thorough 
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comprehension of the issue at hand when considering both types of volatility (Zhang 
and Hu, 2013).   
 
The paper is structured as follows: we review the relevant literature in section 2, 
whilst section 3 offers information about the empirical setting and the data set.  In 
section 4, we compare the relative volatilities on NSE and BSE, and in section 5 we 
investigate the impact of the auction suspension by estimating an AGARCH model 
on daily data.  A summary of the main findings and insights is shown in section 6.   
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Trading frameworks may either rely exclusively on call auctions or continuous 
trading, or else the protocol may provide for a hybrid system.  Call auctions differ in 
their structure and such variations may have distinct implications on the trading 
process (Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006).  In addition, the market context in 
which auctions are held may also affect their efficacy and this partly accounts for the 
mixed evidence outlined below.  
 
One determining factor which impacts on auction efficacy is the information signals 
sent by traders when submitting orders.  In the theoretical study of Madhavan (1992) 
and in the analysis of Economides and Schwartz (1995) it was noted that call 
auctions aggregate the expectations of a cross section of traders and thus augment 
price discovery.  One may deduce that this feature contributes towards a lower 
dispersion of prices around fundamental values, and therefore a lower overall 
volatility.  Contradictory insights from the theoretical model of Caillaud and Mezzetti 
(2004) suggest that traders may use the auction framework strategically so that they 
hold back information to trade upon it profitably at a subsequent stage.  
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The theoretical study of Chakraborty, Pagano and Schwartz (2012) and the 
experimental study of Biais, Bisière and Pouget (2014) suggest that the information 
dissemination benefits of auctions may be enhanced through a pre-opening session, 
where market participants can submit non-binding orders, thereby exchanging 
opinions about the fundamental values of stocks.  Chakraborty, Pagano and 
Schwartz (2012) suggested that a trading venue may offer both a transparent pre-
open process and an additional hidden facility for those traders who would like to 
conceal their orders.  The latter feature could be used as a stock of orders for the 
purpose of reducing imbalances on either side of the market, rather than to establish 
an opening price.   
 
Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) noted that on the (former) Paris Bourse, the orders 
posted during the initial phases of the pre-opening auction may be classified as 
‘noise’ and price discovery mainly occurs at the final phase of the auction.  
Conversely, studies focusing on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Davies, 2003) and the 
West-African Bourse (Dia and Pouget, 2011) suggested that the majority of pre-
opening orders were submitted with an actual purpose to trade.  
 
Prior literature has also focused on the idea that call auctions may be used to 
misguide other traders, for instance through the submission of mispriced orders 
which are subsequently withdrawn.  Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) studied how 
diverse auction algorithms handle manipulative orders. When considering a less 
liquid stock, the auction established a price in the presence of a manipulative order, 
yet no price was set when such order was eliminated.  This challenges the traditional 
thought that auctions facilitate the trading of less liquid stocks, by creating a deeper 
market through aggregating orders.  Pinfold and He (2012) analysed the 
implementation of a closing call auction on the New Zealand securities market and 
noted lower potential for market manipulation and increased pricing efficiency in the 
auction setup.  
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In order to minimise the possibility that traders misguide the markets through 
manipulative orders, the auction may include features such as a random market 
opening time or the requirement that orders submitted during the auction remain 
binding up to the termination of the auction (Biais, Bisière and Pouget, 2014).   
 
Overall, this strand of literature suggests that auctions may process information more 
efficiently; however potential manipulators may take advantage of this feature to 
misguide other participants.  Given the diverse implications which such trends may 
have on pricing efficiency and volatility, one may not form straightforward 
expectations regarding the potential outcomes of the auction suspension which we 
are considering in this paper.   
 
The efficacy of auctions may be compromised by lack of trading interest.  Madhavan 
and Panchapagesan (2000) found that in case of the New York Stock Exchange 
opening auction, less liquid stocks were more prone to mispricing owing to order 
imbalances.  Chakraborty, Pagano and Schwartz (2012) proposed that trading 
venues may introduce an animator to take the opposite side of orders and address 
such imbalances.    
 
The notion that lack of trading activity may lessen auction efficacy should not be 
sidelined in the context of the NSE auction suspension which we tackle in this study.  
For instance, Camilleri and Green (2009) reported that only 7% to 18.6% of the less 
liquid stocks in their sample traded in the NSE opening auction.  Nonetheless, given 
that in this paper we use index data which are computed through a portfolio of highly 
liquid stocks, such factors might not have any direct impacts on our findings. 
 
Various empirical papers have considered the volatility impacts of the introduction of 
auctions in a trading venue, or opted for comparative studies across exchanges.  For 
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instance, Ronen (1998) studied the impact of the change from a closing call auction 
to an opening call auction system on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange in 1988.  The 
author reported that this modification did not result in material changes in volatility 
during the initial stages of the trading session.  
 
Chang et. al. (2008) analysed the implementation of call auctions at the start and at 
the end of the trading day on the Singapore Stock Exchange which took place in the 
year 2000.  It was noted that this initiative curtailed volatility especially in the case of 
liquid stocks.  The latter notion was not fully confirmed by Chelley-Steeley (2008) 
who investigated the inclusion of a closing call auction on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1997.  The author found that the resulting increase in pricing efficiency 
was more pronounced in the case of less liquid stocks.  
 
Comerton-Forde (1999) investigated stock return data from the Australian Stock 
Exchange and the Jakarta Stock Exchange.  The former exchange commences with 
a call auction, while the latter one commences with continuous trading.  The author 
concluded that auctions reduce volatility at the initial phases of the trading sessions.  
 
Kandel, Rindi and Bosetti (2012) analysed the impacts of closing auctions on the 
Borsa Italiana and the (former) Paris Bourse.  They concluded that these auctions 
curtailed volatility, lowered the spreads and reduced trading volumes during the last 
minutes of the continuous trading session.  This was attributed to market participants 
becoming less impatient to trade during this period due to the availability of the 
auction.  The spread reductions materialised in lower volatility due to a diminished 
bid-ask bounce effect.   
 
Pagano, Peng and Schwartz (2013) considered the introduction of opening and 
closing call auctions on NASDAQ in 2004 and reported an impact on the continuous 
trading session in terms of a drop in volatility especially towards the closing.   
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Aitken, Comerton-Forde and Frino (2005) analysed the introduction of closing call 
auctions on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1997, and noted that on high-volatility 
days there was a pronounced tendency for traders to postpone their trading towards 
the auction.  They suggested that call auctions prove more useful to traders on high-
volatility days.   
 
Overall, the prior studies which considered the introduction of call auctions seem to 
point at reduced volatility following the implementation of these trading frameworks.  
Thus, one may expect that an auction suspension as considered in this paper may 
be followed by increased volatility.  A different outcome could constitute an 
interesting addition to the literature which may call for the re-thinking of the former 
findings.   
 
Trading venues also use auctions in order to stabilise the market following unusually 
large price movements such as a flash-crash.  Brewer, Cvitanic and Plott (2013) set 
up experimental market microstructure settings and found that auctions were the 
most suited framework to stabilise prices following such occurrences.  This 
corroborates the findings of Reboredo (2012) who reported that on the Spanish 
Stock Exchange, call auctions held following abnormal price movements contributed 
towards lower volatility.   
 
Prior studies have also tackled the empirical case which we are considering in this 
paper.  Camilleri and Green (2009) reported contradictory evidence regarding 
volatility changes following the auction suspension on NSE.  They noted a significant 
reduction in price dispersion during the trading day but a significant increase in 
volatility in terms of the tendency for overnight returns to reverse at a subsequent 
stage.  Camilleri (2015) found an overall reduction in volatility coefficients, when 
fitting GARCH models on intra-day data.  The author also reported an increased 
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variance in opening return distributions sampled at one-minute intervals, but reduced 
variances in return distributions for the remaining part of the trading day.   
 
It is the aim of this paper to glean further empirical evidence so that the impacts of 
this auction suspension may be assessed more clearly by using different 
methodologies and through the comparison of NSE and BSE data.  Given that the 
theoretical relationship between call auctions and volatility is still unresolved due to 
contrasting findings, we believe that this empirical study offers a contribution towards 
addressing this gap in the literature.   
  
3.  Empirical Context and Data 
 
The NSE and the BSE are the main stock exchanges in India and these venues 
compete for listings and order flow.  Major Indian stocks are quoted on both 
venues.  The exchanges are characterised by a broad range of stocks and high 
trading volumes in the case of liquid securities.   
 
The setting up of NSE in 1994 resulted in considerable restructuring of the Indian 
market through the promotion of transparency and better organised frameworks for 
settlement, securities lending and derivatives trading.  The number of equities 
trading on NSE as at November 2014 stood at approximately 1,600, whilst the 
volume of a typical trading day on the exchange was around 7 million transactions.   
 
In the late 1990s, NSE introduced opening and closing call auctions to complement 
its order-driven system. During the intermediate part of the day, trading occurred 
through a continuous limit order book.  The auctions established prices with the main 
aim of maximising trading volume.  During the auction, orders could be modified or 
cancelled, while orders which included bargain conditions such as ‘all-or-none’ were 
not taken into consideration.  
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The auctions were suspended on 9th June 1999, probably due to software-related 
problems.  Camilleri and Green (2009) established that the software glitches did not 
affect the pricing process, with the possible exception of the closing auction held on 
the 8th June.  The authors also noted that closing auctions were more active than the 
opening ones.   
 
The main data set used in this investigation consists of daily observations of the NSE 
Nifty Index.  This is one of the principal indices published by NSE which includes 50 
large-capitalisation securities.  The observations used for assessing volatility 
changes following the auction suspension, run from 1st February 1999 to 16th 
November 1999.  When comparing NSE volatility with that prevailing on BSE, we 
also use the data for the S&P BSE 100 Index which includes the 100 largest 
companies traded on BSE.  When adjusting the original data for seasonality as 
required in section 5, we use a longer time series of the Nifty index observations to 
glean information about seasonality patterns – from January 1997 to December 
2001. 
 
 
4.  Comparing NSE and BSE Volatility  
 
In order to assess the efficacy of the NSE auctions in curtailing volatility, we first 
compared the volatility of the Nifty Index with that of the S&P BSE 100, using the 
data sample from 1st February to 16th November 1999.[1]  Since both indices 
comprise large-capitalisation Indian firms and given that a number of issues trade on 
both exchanges, it is likely that any relative changes in volatility emanate from 
market microstructure features, such as whether call auctions were held at specific 
stages of the trading day.   
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We used two volatility proxies in this comparison: the modulus of log returns, and the 
scaled intra-day price difference which is equal to the difference between the highest 
and the lowest index value during the trading day, divided by the opening value.   
 
We thus estimated the following two models: 
tta
b
tt dyy εβαpi +++= ,        [1] 
tta
b
tt dss εβαpi +++= ,        [2] 
where yt denotes the log return on NSE on day t, ybt is the log return on BSE on day 
t, st and sbt are the scaled intra-day price difference on day t on NSE and BSE 
respectively, da,t is a dummy variable which took a value of one  during the auction 
period and zero thereafter, π, α, and β are parameters and εt is an error term.  If the 
volatility on NSE was comparatively lower during the auction period, one would 
expect a negative β in both models.   
 
Table 1: NSE and BSE Volatility Comparisons 
 
PANEL A: Modulus of Closing Returns as Volatility Proxy 
   
π (intercept) α (coefficient of |ybt|) β (coefficient of da,t) 
0.0008 0.8858 *** 0.0011 
(0.96) (22.49) (1.09) 
 
R2 :  0.7303                        Adjusted R2 :  0.7275           Number of Observations:  197 
 
PANEL B: Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference as Volatility Proxy 
 
π (intercept) α (coefficient of sbt) β (coefficient of da,t) 
0.0050 *** 0.8642 *** -0.0005 
(5.40) (25.21) (0.54) 
 
R2 :  0.7681                        Adjusted R2 :  0.7658           Number of Observations:  198 
 
 
The table shows the results obtained when regressing NSE volatility proxies, over the 
corresponding ones for BSE and a dummy variable da,t which took a value of one 
during the call auction period and zero otherwise.  Panel A shows the estimation using 
the modulus of closing log returns (|yt| and |ybt|), whilst Panel B shows the estimation 
using the scaled intra-day price difference (st and sbt) as volatility proxies.  Regression 
coefficients are shown on top and t-ratios are reported in brackets underneath.  
Significance at the 99% level of confidence is denoted by ***.   
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Results shown in Table 1 indicate that β is not statistically significant, and it took a 
positive value in the first model and a negative value in the second one.  Given this, 
these results did not yield a clear insight regarding the volatility impact of the auction 
suspension.  
 
  
5.  Modelling Volatility Changes through Absolute Value GARCH 
 
One major challenge encountered in the investigation of longer term volatility on 
NSE is the monthly seasonality which includes an increase in volatility following the 
closing of the accounting years of many Indian companies in March.  Whilst 
seasonality was not problematic in the previous models (since it was common to 
both data sets which were compared), it made the NSE data biased against the 
auction regime for the purposes of the subsequent investigation.  The higher volatility 
month coincided with the call auction period while other low volatility months fell 
within the auction suspension period.  In this way, we adjusted the data for 
seasonality given that this is not related to the auctions.  
 
We thus extended the original data set, in order to glean information about monthly 
seasonality on NSE and make the required adjustments.  For this purpose we used a 
time series of the Nifty closing values from 2nd January 1997 to 31st December 2001.  
We estimated an OLS regression with the log return modulus as the dependant 
variable, whilst the explanatory variables were eleven dummies for the months of 
February to December.   Results confirmed a significant increase in volatility during 
April and a significant reduction in volatility during August, November and December 
(Table 2 Panel A).   
 
In order to use a parsimonious model, a further regression was estimated as follows:  
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ttdectnovtaugtaprt ddddy εδχβαpi +++++= ,,,,      [3] 
where yt denotes the log return on NSE on day t, dapr,t , daug,t , dnov,t , and ddec,t are 
four dummy variables for the months of April, August, November and December 
which took a value one during the respective month and zero otherwise, π, α, β, χ, 
and δ are parameters and εt is an error term.  Results shown in Table 2 Panel B 
confirm the underlying seasonality pattern.   
 
Table 2: Monthly Seasonality of Volatility 
         
Panel A:  
Estimation using Eleven Dummy Variables 
Panel B:  
Parsimonious Model 
       
   Coefficient (T-ratio)  Coefficient (T-ratio) 
      
Intercept  0.0145 *** (12.01) π (Intercept)  0.0136 *** (32.25) 
Dummy Variables:   Dummy Variables:   
  February -0.0023 (1.33)     
  March  0.0023 (1.39)  α (coeff. of dapr,t)  0.0047 *** (3.59) 
  April  0.0039 ** (2.24)     
  May -0.0011 (0.67)  β (coeff. of daug,t) -0.0034 *** (2.65) 
  June -0.0012 (0.71)     
  July -0.0027 (1.64)  χ (coeff. of dnov,t) -0.0025 ** (1.97) 
  August -0.0042 ** (2.48)     
  September -0.0021 (1.23)  δ (coeff. of ddec,t) -0.0028 ** (2.23) 
  October  0.0004 (0.26)     
 November -0.0034 ** (1.98)     
 December -0.0037 ** (2.16)     
        
R2 0.0356 R2  0.0246 
Adjusted R2 0.0270 Adjusted R2 0.0214 
F-statistic 4.1298 F-Statistic 7.7960 
Number of Observations 1244 Number of Observations 1244 
 
In the above models, volatility was measured in terms of the log return moduli.  In the model shown 
in Panel A, the explanatory variables constituted of an intercept and eleven dummy variables for the 
months of February to December.  In the parsimonious model shown in Panel B, the explanatory 
variables constituted of an intercept and four dummy variables for the months of April, August, 
November and December.  Statistical significance is denoted by *** and ** for the 99% and 95% 
confidence levels respectively.   
 
 
In order to adjust for the observed seasonality, we calculated the overall average of 
log return moduli for the five-year time series, and then estimated the averages for 
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each of the five sub-sets consisting of April, August, November, December and rest-
of-the-year observations.  For each sub-set, we then computed the ratio of the sub-
set average to the overall average.  These ratios were then used as divisors on the 
original observations, in order to scale the data for each sub-set.  In this way we 
obtained a more uniform data dispersion, across the respective periods of the year.   
 
We then used the seasonally adjusted data from 1st February to 16th November 1999 
in order to assess volatility changes following the auction suspension.  As a 
preliminary test, we regressed the modulus of seasonally-adjusted Nifty returns as 
follows: 
 
ttat dy εβpi ++= ,*        [4] 
where y*t is the seasonally-adjusted log return on day t, da,t is a dummy variable 
which took the value of one during the call auction period and zero thereafter, 
π and β are estimated coefficients, and εt is an error term.  The results shown in 
Table 3 indicate that volatility was higher during the call auction period, however the 
auction dummy is not statistically significant.   
 
Table 3: Regressing Seasonally-Adjusted Log Return Moduli on A Call Auction 
Dummy 
  
π (Intercept) β (coefficient of da,t) Explanatory Statistics 
0.0129 *** 0.0018 R2                     0.0054 
(11.62) (1.05) Adjusted R2       0.0005 
  
 
The table shows the results obtained when regressing the seasonally-adjusted Nifty 
log return moduli |y*t|, over an intercept π, and a dummy variable da,t which took the 
value of one during the call auction period and zero otherwise.  The time series 
comprised 204 observations.  Regression coefficients are shown on top and t-ratios 
are reported underneath.  Significance is denoted by *** for the 99% confidence level.   
 
 
We then progressed with the estimation of an AGARCH model using the seasonally-
adjusted Nifty returns.  In order to select the model which best captures the return 
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generating process, we estimated six AR(ρ) models, with ρ ranging from 0 to 5.  Both 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and the Akaike Information Criterion selected an 
AR(0) process.  LM heteroskedasticity tests (Engle; 1982) rejected the null 
hypothesis of no ARCH effects at the 95% level of confidence.[2]  
 
Table 4: AGARCH Model with an Auction Dummy 
 
Return Generating Process AR(0): 
 
Intercept of AR (0) process Explanatory Statistics 
0.0022 R2                            -0.00003 
(1.58) Adjusted R2             -0.01518 
 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
 
π α              β ω 
0.0176 0.1603 ** -0.1541 0.0015 
(0.13) (1.81)              (0.19) (0.56) 
 
Wald Test Statistic for the null hypothesis that α
 
+
 
β
  
+ ω = 0: 
0.0001 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of 
confidence. 
 
Wald Test Statistic for the null hypothesis that α
 
+ β
  
= 0: 
0.00006 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of 
confidence. 
 
Wald Test Statistic for the null hypothesis that ω = 0: 
0.3161 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of 
confidence. 
 
 
The table shows the results for an AGARCH process estimated on the Nifty Index log 
returns (202 observations).  The conditional volatility equation included a dummy variable 
(da,t) which took a value of one during the call auction period, and zero otherwise.  The t-
ratios are shown in brackets underneath the respective coefficients.  Significance at the 
95% confidence level is denoted by **.   
 
 
An AGARCH model was then estimated, where returns were modelled as an AR(0) 
process and conditional volatility was modelled as follows: 
 
tattt dhh ,11 ωβεαpi +++= −−        [5] 
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where ht is the conditional standard deviation of the error term at time t, εt is the 
unexpected return observed during day t, da,t is an auction dummy as defined above 
and π, α, β and ω are coefficients.   
 
Estimations shown in Table 4, yielded a positive (yet statistically insignificant) 
coefficient for the dummy variable da,t , indicating a higher conditional volatility during 
the auction regime.  The results of this test are thus consistent with the previous one, 
in that we obtained weak evidence against the call auction setup.  
 
  
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analysed volatility changes following the suspension of opening and 
closing call auctions on NSE.  We compared the volatility prevailing on the NSE with 
that on BSE, using the log return moduli and the scaled intra-day price differences.  
The inclusion of an auction dummy in the respective models yielded contrasting (and 
statistically insignificant) indications as to whether the auction suspension resulted in 
higher or lower volatility on NSE when compared to its counterpart. 
 
We also focused on volatility trends in NSE inter-day data, following adjustments for 
seasonality prevailing on the Indian markets.  Tests on log return moduli revealed 
that realised volatility was higher during the auction period; however the difference 
was not statistically significant.  Modelling volatility through an AGARCH process 
reinforced this indication, since conditional volatility was found to be higher during 
the auction period, although the dummy variable was insignificant. 
 
Collectively, these outcomes may be interpreted as mild evidence against the 
auction setup.  These findings challenge the intuition that by aggregating the orders 
of a cross-section of traders, call auctions enhance price discovery and reduce the 
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dispersion of prices around fundamental values.  The above evidence is in line with 
that of Camilleri and Green (2009) and Camilleri (2015) that the NSE call auctions 
were less effective than one may expect.  Despite this, the results of this paper differ 
from prior studies outlined above which associated the presence of call auctions with 
reduced volatility (Comerton-Forde, 1999; Chang et. al., 2008; Pagano, Peng and 
Schwartz, 2013). 
 
This suggests that the auction structure should be carefully thought out, in order to 
increase the likelihood that any expected benefits materialise in practice.  Factors 
that may have compromised the NSE auction efficacy include the possibility that its 
setup was not suitable for the particular market characteristics or that its 
effectiveness was hindered by interactions with other market features.  For instance, 
the transparency of an auction is an aspect which may prove particularly 
challenging.  Low transparency levels might preclude correctly-priced orders from 
being displayed to the market when the fundamental value deviates considerably 
from the market clearing price.  Conversely, increased transparency may facilitate 
collusion between traders by making it easier to infer other participants’ strategies, 
and it also increases the cost of the “free option” problem related to limit orders 
(Madhavan, Porter and Weaver, 2005).  In addition, the relationship between pre-
trade transparency and market quality is not necessarily a linear one (Eom, Ok and 
Park, 2007) and it may be affected by factors such as market depth (Frutos and 
Manzano, 2014). 
 
Designers should also consider whether auctions make sense in the particular 
circumstances; for instance the use of auctions to manipulate stock prices 
(Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006) may have been more prevalent in India where 
markets were traditionally prone to dubious trading practices (Shah and Sivakumar, 
2000; Agarwal and Singh, 2006).  Trading venues may thus implement features to 
reduce the potential for submitting manipulative orders, such as a random market 
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opening time or restrictions on the cancellation of orders during the auction (Biais, 
Bisière and Pouget, 2014).   
 
In addressing potential order imbalances, exchanges may consider the inclusion of 
an animator who takes the opposite side of orders to facilitate trading during the 
auction (Chakraborty, Pagano and Schwartz, 2012).  These considerations suggest 
that further research is required to assess how the auction structure or other 
subsidiary market features may compromise auction effectiveness, as was 
apparently taking place on NSE.   
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Footnotes: 
 
  
[1]
  Observations pertaining to particular days when one of the exchanges was closed 
for trading were deleted from the sample. 
 
 [2]
  Tests for volatility asymmetry indicated that it was not necessary to account for 
this feature.  We used an asymmetric volatility test where the squared error term 
from an AR(1) model was regressed over an intercept, an error term and a dummy 
variable of the lagged error sign which denotes asymmetric volatility (Engle and Ng, 
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1993).  The dummy variable was insignificant, with a coefficient of 0.00009 and a t-
ratio of 1.09. 
 
